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MONTHLY REVIEW

AN INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

REVIEW OF THE MONTH

THE EDITORS

**THE AMERICAN STRUGGLE AGAINST
HUMAN RIGHTS**

A Special Correspondent

LEFT SOCIALISM IN ISRAEL

An Israeli Socialist

VOL. 2

9

EDITORS . . . LEO HUBERMAN . . . PAUL M. SWEETZ

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

By far the best news we have to report is that new subscriptions are continuing to come in at a high rate. Our circulation is moving steadily up, and that is very encouraging indeed.

So too, is the fact that we continue to lose relatively few old subscribers. But may we again urge readers to take the trouble to renew subs promptly when they expire—or, better still, before they expire? When a sub runs out and is not renewed, we have to send out a reminder, and if that doesn't work another reminder. By that time we often get the renewal, but we've also wasted a lot of time and money that might have been invested in more constructive ways. It would be better all around if you, gentle reader, would take a look now at the code number under your name on the envelope in which

(continued on inside back cover)

THE CRISIS FROM THREE ANGLES

The Far Eastern crisis which is now rocking the world has deep roots and wide ramifications. It is like a great earthquake which registers abrupt shifts in the planetary crust and sends its tremors out to the farthest corners of the globe. Its shock is so sharp and terrifying that we are apt to forget that it is part of a cosmic process which is not blind and arbitrary but which follows an overall pattern that makes sense and can be understood. And yet it is precisely in times of deep crisis that we most need to keep our heads, to maintain a sense of proportion, to see things in perspective.

First of all, let us look at the situation from the standpoint of the historian. In other words, let us attempt to view the present as history. What is the essential meaning of this crisis?

Surely the answer is that the present crisis is a landmark, perhaps even a decisive turning point, in the worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism. In Korea we have had a second conclusive, irrefutable proof of the enormous power and energy let loose by the socialist revolution. The first was provided by the Soviet Union in the years of the early Five Year Plans and above all in the decisive defeat inflicted by the Red Army at Stalingrad on a Nazi military machine which drew sustenance from the industrial strength of all central and western Europe. And now China, but recently a prostrate giant, the helpless object of imperialist rivalries, rises up and smites the flower of American military power. It is doubtful if history records a comparable transformation in the condition and strength of a great nation, certainly none in which the cause is so plain for all to see. For all the world has been watching the Chinese Revolution with fascinated interest, and all the world can see that it is revolution and nothing but revolution that has unified China and enabled the Chinese people to realize their latent strength.

It took the crisis to reveal the new state of affairs. The crisis has acted like a floodlight which, being thrown upon a darkened stage, reveals a complete change of scenery. Least of all did the American ruling class understand what was happening in China, and it was precisely this lack of comprehension that brought the crisis to a head. The American ruling class acted toward China as though nothing had

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happened, as though China were still divided, weak, and helpless. The event proved that this is no longer the case, that the socialist revolution has transformed China into a great power.

The lessons of the crisis, seen in this light, are enormously significant, and they are not likely to be lost upon the peoples and nations of the earth. There are divided, weak, helpless nations in the world—many of them. They now have renewed proof that the way to overcome their divisions, their weakness, their helplessness, is not through relying on the advanced capitalist countries of the West (as did the China of Chiang Kai-shek) but on the contrary through breaking with the advanced capitalist countries, *repudiating* their institutions and methods, and striking out boldly on the path of socialist revolution. Some may argue, of course, that the mere fact of China's increased military power is not enough to support such broad conclusions. The argument is essentially beside the point: the conclusions will be drawn. Ordinary people know intuitively—much better than the sophisticated experts—that a sudden upsurge of military strength is not something that happens in isolation; it is but the surface indicator of a general social renewal which will in due course manifest itself in all spheres of community life.

We can thus say that the Chinese victory over the United States in Korea signifies above all two things: first, that a profound shift in the balance of international power in favor of socialism has already taken place; and second, that this shift, now that it is obvious for all to see, will bring in its wake further shifts in the same direction.

These further shifts will doubtless be centered in Asia where the impact of recent developments is bound to be sharp and direct. This fact is already understood by many Americans. Witness, for example, the following dispatch from Tokyo by Christopher Rand, one of the most perceptive of the Far Eastern correspondents:

The impotence of our type of power in Korea will have far-reaching lessons for Asia as a whole. There can be no doubt that American ideas of what we can do by intervention in Indo-China must be reviewed. The same is probably true for the rest of continental southeast Asia. The British, for instance, are now barely holding their own against Communist guerrillas in Malaya. The chances of their being helped out of this fix by western reinforcements look much dimmer now than they did a fortnight ago. (*New York Herald Tribune*, Dec. 3, 1950.)

But it would be a grave mistake to suppose that the shift toward socialism will be limited to Asia. It will be felt in the Middle East, in Africa, throughout the colonial world, and even in western Europe itself. The American press has painted a false picture of western Europe as a united and relatively prosperous community of nations

swayed only by fear of Russia and hope of protection from America. Actually large parts of western Europe are in the throes of a bitter class struggle; the workers, ground down by a combination of "normal" capitalist exploitation, inflation, and monopolistic restrictionism, are literally fighting for their lives against American-backed ruling classes which are concerned only to hang on to their privileges. At the moment, Italy is the center of this struggle. "The Italian workers' demands," reports Aylmer Vallance in the *New Statesman and Nation* (Nov. 4, 1950), "are basically revolutionary in character: they are not compatible with the continued existence of the clerical-capitalist regime which has made Italy a country of two nations." Does any one imagine that the embattled Italian workers will not take courage and gain new recruits for their struggle as a result of the defeat suffered in Korea by the American supporters of Italian reaction?

It is one world after all, and the Far Eastern crisis will have its repercussions in every part of it. The historian of the future is likely to record that the most important and lasting of those repercussions was a quickening of the pace of the worldwide transition from capitalism to socialism.

Let us now attempt, if we can, to look at the crisis through Chinese eyes. Actually, if we can forget for the moment the "mysteries of the oriental mind" and put aside the fantasies of American propaganda, this should not be too difficult.

For a hundred and fifty years, more or less, China has been kicked around, exploited, and insulted by the western imperialist powers. During World War II, the China of Chiang Kai-shek was given the status of an "honorary great power," but still the western countries refused to take her seriously, still less to treat her as an equal. Then came the Chinese Revolution, and almost overnight China became a *real* great power. She was immediately recognized as such by the socialist world: China and the Soviet Union entered into a treaty of alliance and mutual assistance as full-scale equals. But the western countries (with some honorable exceptions), acting under the leadership, and indeed on this matter under the domination, of the United States, now proceeded to compound the injuries and insults of the past. Far from recognizing the new state of affairs in China, they maintained a puppet Chinese government of their own, refused to enter into normal economic relations, and incited counter-revolutionaries to attack the new regime and stir up trouble inside the country, all the while reading the long-suffering Chinese moralizing lectures on the nature and necessity of international virtue.

It is against this background that the Korean affair must be viewed. The new Chinese regime was naturally from the beginning sympathetic with the revolutionary North Koreans and opposed to

the Syngman Rhee government in South Korea—the essential similarity between Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek, as well as the identity of the common backer of these two gentlemen, would hardly be likely to escape Chinese attention. Nevertheless, the Peking government refrained from intervening as long as the fighting took place south of the 38th Parallel, where, according to the original United States and United Nations pronouncements, it should have remained. This non-intervention on the part of the Chinese was the more noteworthy in that it was decided upon in the face of the open and unilateral violation of Chinese sovereignty by the United States in its action regarding Formosa.

This was the state of affairs when the tide of battle turned in favor of the United States, following the Inchon landings in September. The Chinese still refrained from intervening but issued a clear warning that they would intervene if the war was carried into North Korea. The warning was issued in public statements by Foreign Minister Chou En-lai and in diplomatic communications to the Indian ambassador in Peking. The warnings were not heeded by the United States and its compliant majority in the United Nations. MacArthur plunged across the 38th Parallel, blasting everything in his path, bringing Syngman Rhee's hangmen with him—still to the accompaniment of lectures on international morality from Washington and Lake Success. The United States was treating China as the western powers had been accustomed to treating China for more than a century, with a combination of contempt and hypocrisy.

They used to get away with it for the very simple reason that China was helpless. Now that China is no longer helpless, now that China is a great power in fact as well as in name, they can no longer get away with it. If the United States wouldn't believe it, then Chinese armies would have to give a precise and practical demonstration.

They did, and from the Chinese point of view that is the essential meaning of this crisis. Having achieved the actual status of a great power, China is now serving notice on the world that she insists on being treated as every other great power would as a matter of course insist on being treated.

A common American reaction to this line of reasoning is to harp on the fact that the United Nations is backing the American intervention in Korea and to ask whether the Chinese have no respect for the United Nations. The answer is that the Chinese have enough respect for the United Nations to want to be admitted to it, but that until they are admitted they do not and cannot grant that they are in any way bound by United Nations decisions. On this point, the speech of Wu Hsiu-chuan, Peking representative, before the Security Council on November 28th was perfectly explicit:

Members of the Security Council, I would like to remind you that so long as the United Nations persists in denying admittance to a permanent member of the Security Council who represents 475 million people, it cannot make lawful decisions on any major issues or solve any major problems, particularly those which concern Asia. Indeed, without the participation of the lawful delegates of the People's Republic of China, representing 475 million people, the United Nations cannot in practice be worthy of its name. Without the participation of the lawful delegates of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese people have no reason to recognize any resolutions or decisions of the United Nations.

Faced with similar circumstances, every American with a shred of national self-respect would react in exactly the same way. Americans who will take the trouble to examine the Chinese point of view should have no trouble at all in understanding it.

All this, of course, has plain implications for the further course of the crisis. Having demonstrated that she is a great power and is entitled to be treated as such by the other great powers, China is not likely to relax her pressure in Korea or anywhere else where she can bring pressure to bear, or to enter into negotiations, until this "situation of fact" (to use a favorite phrase of Mr. Acheson's) is frankly recognized by all the other great powers. That means that American attempts to separate Korea from the problems of Formosa, admission of China to the UN, Chinese participation in the writing of the Japanese treaty, and so on, are doomed to failure. Recognition of China as an equal is the only basis on which Korea or any other Far Eastern problem can be negotiated, let alone settled. The British understand that; all the important members of the United Nations understand it; only the United States doesn't—or chooses to pretend that it doesn't.

This brings us to a consideration of the American ruling class's view of the crisis. It is an unedifying and unappetizing subject. The American ruling class has never been famous for the breadth of its view or the depth of its insight; it has always tended to be smug and hypocritical. Now it is also afraid—afraid of the collapse of its own economy, afraid of the awakening of the American people, afraid of the loss of its allies, afraid of the strength of its enemies. The ruling class's attitude toward the crisis is compounded of narrowness, shallowness, smugness, hypocrisy, and fear. It is blind to the great historical drama which is now unfolding before us, the drama of the spread of socialism and the attainment of strength and equality by the backward peoples of the earth. Instead, the American ruling class sees only ruthless grabs for empire, vicious plots, and cynical maneuvers. Everything must perforce be reduced to its own level and interpreted

in terms of its own sordid ambitions. At the same time it cannot admit, even to itself, the degraded standards by which it lives and thinks; it must pretend to a high nobility of purpose, the more vehemently the less its protestations are believed.

Seen in these terms, the present crisis appears to stem from an aggressive attack by the Kremlin's Chinese puppets on the good UN policeman sent to enforce peace in the Far East and to restore freedom and democracy to a ravaged Korea. By declining to negotiate with Peking, the American government is bravely turning its back on appeasement and, in the currently fashionable phrase, "refusing to reward aggression." We, the United States of America, paragons of virtue and selflessness, will stand fast in the path of righteousness; come what may, we will, with God's help and blessing, go on fighting for peace, democracy, freedom, and morality in Korea—and everywhere else.

Needless to say, this whole picture of the crisis—American motivation and policy included—has only the most twisted and tortured relation to reality. China is obviously fighting for the most elementary and basic Chinese interests. The Korean civil war would have been over in a few weeks but for American intervention: the UN policeman brought not peace but war and devastation to the Far East. The kind of "freedom and democracy" which MacArthur and Syngman Rhee would like to bestow upon Korea is the same kind that Japan brought to that unhappy country in the years after 1905, the same kind against which the whole of Asia is in open revolt. Finally, United States policy has no relation to the high ideals mouthed by its apologists but is simply designed to preserve the old order, everywhere and at any cost, against the rising tide of international socialism.

Unfortunately, however, exposing the tawdriness and falseness of an idea or an attitude does not do away with it or destroy it as an effective historical force. The American ruling class has succeeded, through its control over the media of mass communication, in imposing its version of events on a large part of the American people and in this way has secured their support for a course of action from which, in the long run, they themselves will be the chief sufferers. Let us look more closely at this question of the consequences of America's Far Eastern policy.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN POLICY

The first and most obvious consequence of American policy in the Far East is the slaughter and maiming of thousands of human beings, the destruction of cities and factories, the building up of

hatreds which at best will endure as long as people now alive can remember. And the American people themselves are not passive observers of this carnage; they are its victims, in one sense its chief victims. Americans are dying in Korea, and soon may be dying in other parts of the Far East, not in defense of their own country or interests but to impose a hated system on the people who live there and who by all traditional American standards have a right to determine their own fate. The "reservoir of good will" toward America which Wendell Willkie found so full when he travelled in Asia during World War II is turning into a reservoir of hate which the American people will find it a veritable labor of Hercules to drain in the years ahead.

It is not only Asia that is turning against the United States. Nearly everybody who isn't under the thrall of American ruling-class propaganda understands and sympathizes with the Chinese in the present crisis. They see the United States, not China, as the aggressor. They know that, in a similar situation, they would act as the Chinese have acted. Hence in a psychological sense China's enemy is their enemy. By trampling on the rights of one country, the United States has trampled on the rights of all countries. From the very beginning of the present crisis, therefore, popular sympathy for the United States has declined.

But this is not all. The United States has been regarded throughout with utmost fear and apprehension. People everywhere believe that the United States has the power at any time to turn the Korean war into a general war which would engulf every one, and at the back of their minds lurks the awful suspicion that this is just what the United States *wants* to do. President Truman's seemingly offhand threat to use the atom bomb in Korea sent a shock of horror around the world; even the client ruling classes of America's docile satellites drew back as if from something contaminated and unclean. Attlee's hurried visit to Washington, following an equally hurried visit of the French premier and foreign minister to London, revealed that the whole structure of the North Atlantic Pact was about to collapse; even the best-paid, and hence generally considered to be the most loyal, of America's allies were obviously falling away.

Make no mistake: the process has not been stopped, still less reversed. The Truman-Attlee conversations resulted in a communique which stressed unity in words and revealed deep divisions in fact. The pace of disintegration cannot always be as fast as it was in those first few days of the crisis, but the underlying causes of disintegration are still operating and will continue to operate unless and until American policy is changed—not in some minor details here and there, but fundamentally, in its basic design and purpose.

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Finally, we must note the extremely important fact that more and more people in the United States, including many in circles where policies are made and executed, are beginning to realize that the nation's course in international affairs is leading straight into a blind alley. They are seeing, with ever-increasing clarity, that already the balance of international forces is such that the United States could start but not win a war; and they cannot but sense that the balance is shifting, slowing but surely, against the United States. Consider, for example, the following excerpts from an Associated Press dispatch, dated Charlottesville, Virginia, December 12:

Joseph P. Kennedy, former Ambassador to Great Britain, said tonight that our foreign policy is "suicidal" and "has made us no foul weather friends."

Mr. Kennedy also charged that United States foreign policy has "solidified communism," sapped our economic strength, failed to provide a strong defense in this hemisphere, and is "politically and morally a bankrupt policy."

He proposed that the United States get out of Korea and any other place in Asia where we cannot hope to hold our defense, and to stop wasting our resources in an idle attempt "to hold the line of the Elbe or the line of the Rhine."

The former ambassador said this country had expanded its "political and financial programs on an almost unbelievably wide scale," but that we "have far fewer friends than we had in 1945."

Mr. Kennedy said that the United States has "oil but no friends" in the Middle East and that "Indonesia, Malaya, Indo-China are in revolt or heavy with discontent at the influences we represent."

"Isolationism," the official spokesman will say; but no matter what you call it, it's still true. Nor is it only the "isolationists" who are beginning to think and say such things. Pierre Courtade, foreign editor of the leading French Communist newspaper, reported after a several weeks' stay in this country before and after the election:

I confess to having been surprised at meeting among supporters of the policy of the State Department hesitations and at times even an extremely significant bitterness. The truth is that many of these people no longer know where they stand or where they are going. They no longer have any illusions about the strength of the "American party" in Europe, and they distrust the people at home on whom they must place their reliance. . . .

It is interesting to observe that these "liberals" are to a certain extent joined—despite the horror with which they view the association—by a section of the old "isolationist" party (both Democratic and Republican) which has just had a marked success at the polls. (Courtade's whole dispatch appears below, pp. 428-430).

Doubts and divisions are rife even inside the government itself. Thus James Reston, perhaps the best-informed of the Washington correspondents, can write:

Arguments . . . will not settle the grim immediate military problem and neither will talk. At Lake Success Ambassador Warren Austin plays "Twenty Questions"; in Washington Secretary of State Acheson treats the radio audience to his six piosities; and in Tokyo General MacArthur indulges in at least three interviews. But meanwhile the news from the battlefield is not good and General Bradley's "shocking and bruising fact" [that "Korea had left the free world without an adequate margin of military strength to defend itself elsewhere in the world"] dominates the whole scene. This is what is meant by the humiliation of weakness. (*New York Times*, Dec. 3, 1950.)

From these dawning perceptions—not of military weakness in any absolute sense, of course, but of the fact that the United States cannot impose its will on the world—spring moods of frustration, impotence, and despair. They carry with them both hope and danger. On the one hand, they could presage an abandonment of the present suicidal course, an admission on the part of the ruling class that other people have a right to order their own affairs, and that the United States must adjust itself to an increasingly socialist world. Or they could bring on an insane determination to plunge into the abyss and in the act to encompass the destruction of all mankind.

WHICH WILL IT BE?

Which will it be? A new policy of live and let live? Or a Samson-like attempt to end the world in an atomic holocaust?

No one knows. No one can know. But what is important is that the issue is not yet settled, that time is on the side of life, and that the margin of decision may be extremely close. That means that the American Left, small and weak as it is, may yet be able to play a significant role in the outcome. We do not control the situation; far from it. But when the scales are evenly balanced, a small weight will tip them one way or the other. We of the Left, if we diagnose the situation correctly and act on our diagnosis, can even now exert a little weight, and as time goes by we shall be able to exert more. Let us be sure that we do the most and the best we can.

At the moment the most urgent task is to hasten the disillusionment of the American people. As we have seen above, the process is already under way: over the clamant lying of ruling-class propaganda, facts are beginning to have their say. It is our duty to amplify

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their voice and swell their audience. We must drive home with every resource at our command these truths:

1. American policy is leading not to peace and national security but to war and national disaster.

2. American policy is making not allies but enemies.

3. American military strength can *never* be built up enough to wage successful wars in Asia and Europe. Manpower and distance are the decisive factors: the Soviet Union and China have a combined population of nearly 700 million and would be fighting on home ground; the United States has a population of 150 million and would be fighting anywhere from three to six thousand miles away from home.

4. This disparity cannot be made up by atomic weapons. They can massacre people and destroy cities but not win wars; the massacre and destruction would take place on both sides.

5. This disparity cannot be made up by allied armies. America's allies are weak, and they are turning increasingly against the policy of preparing to fight America's wars.

6. A serious attempt to arm West Germany could precipitate war; it could never add to America's military strength or bring security to any part of Europe.

7. In the Far East the old order of colonialism and white supremacy is already dead; from now on the peoples of that region will decide their own fate, and any one attempting to intervene by force will be thrown out.

8. No country or combination of countries could wage successful warfare against the western hemisphere; none has remotely threatened to try.

9. The decision as to whether the world is to have peace or war, life or death, is entirely up to the United States government, and hence indirectly to the American people.

Drive these truths home—on any and every occasion—singly or in combination. Tear aside the veil of lies that is keeping the American people from seeing the awful peril of their course. These are the tasks of the American Left in this crucial hour of our national history. To the extent that we succeed, we shall contribute to saving not only ourselves but the whole world. And at the same time we shall win new recruits to our cause—the cause to which the future belongs.

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(December 15, 1950)

THE AMERICAN STRUGGLE AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS

BY A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

A widely-held belief in the United States is that Americans lead the world in social, humanitarian, and even egalitarian thinking. More specifically, Mrs. Roosevelt and other United States representatives at the UN are thought to have extended the frontiers of human rights on the international plane.

The opposite is true. The influence of the State Department and of the American delegates at the UN has been to limit and restrict. Examples could be given from several economic and social fields. It is proposed here to show American behavior in one field only, that of Human Rights.

In December, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," which was to be a beacon light to the world—a guide to wider freedoms and a better life. Observers who watched the UN Committee work on this Declaration in the Palais de Chaillot in Paris will remember the recriminations, the intrigue, and the bitter discussion on the articles, the sentences, the words, and even the commas. For while the Declaration was to have no legal authority, no binding force, it was to be a political and social manifesto which might give governments and businessmen and church leaders some uncomfortable moments.

The document was to be revolutionary, but whose revolution would it reflect? Would the Declaration reflect the English revolution of the seventeenth century, the American and French revolutions of the eighteenth century, or the Russian revolution of the twentieth century? Would it reflect Buddha, Christ, or Mohammed; Bolivar, Gandhi, or Lincoln? Would it reflect the feudalism of the Middle East, the economic royalism of the United States, the social democracy of the Scandinavian countries and the British Commonwealth, or the socialism of the USSR? Would it be a composite of all these?

Let us look at the record and see if we can discover the answers to some of these questions.

The UN has an expert body of eighteen members, the Human Rights Commission, which was given the task of getting out the first draft of the document on Human Rights. The original idea was to

This article is by the author of "Inside the United Nations" in the December, 1950, issue of MR.

draw up an International Bill of Rights which every country would sign just as it signs any other international convention. Signature would bind it to carry out the Bill of Rights in its own domestic legislation. At this stage, the Americans displayed a rare example of long term planning on a UN matter. They decided to split the job into two parts. The first would consist of a Declaration of sound and lofty principles which would bind nobody to specific action. The second was to be a Covenant, much more restricted, which would indicate what a (United States) government would be willing to put into its laws. Many countries, however, had populations but recently liberated by war from oppression and colonialism. They had fairly clear ideas of what social justice and human equality and dignity mean, and they wanted to express these clear ideas in one quickly-drafted, legally-binding document which could be signed while the world was still aware of what the UN had fought for and against. But the Americans won the day (Mrs. Roosevelt, incidentally, is Chairman of the Human Rights Commission): there were to be two documents, of which only the second would be legally enforceable.

After this strategic victory of the United States, the eighteen-member Commission began to draft the Declaration—with only the General Assembly to satisfy, for the full Assembly was to have the draft submitted to it for approval.

Unfortunately it is impossible to give in a short space the whole story of American maneuvering. The examples which follow are chosen merely to illustrate the role played by the United States.

The first example deals with discrimination, where the American view was that the less said about it in the Declaration the better. In 1948, the Human Rights Commission was discussing the draft Declaration and had come to the section which stressed that all people should have equality before the law and also have equal protection against discrimination of any kind. Mrs. Roosevelt, speaking for the State Department, wanted the word "arbitrary" inserted in front of the word "discrimination." She was opposed by the French, the Russians, and others, who said that discrimination was bad and that they should say so with no weasel words. A vote of nine to six eliminated the word "arbitrary."

On much the same point, the Soviet delegate wished to add the phrase "and equality before the courts" to the phrase "equality before the law," thus stressing the aim that rich and poor, white or colored, citizens or foreigners, atheists and religious persons, should all get similar treatment when hailed before the courts. Mrs. Roosevelt opposed the Soviet delegate and this time won her point. She said that equality before the law included equality before the courts.

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Others took the view that often there was a vast difference between the law and its administration.

In the same discussion, the question arose as to whether "incitement to discrimination" should be specifically condemned. The French, the Chileans, the Soviets, and others said yes. Mrs. Roosevelt said no. On this occasion, the American view was defeated eight to seven; but Mrs. Roosevelt's leadership was sufficient to defeat a Soviet proposal to make it a crime to advocate national, racial, or religious hostility.

In discussing the article condemning slavery, the Soviet representative wanted the slave trade also condemned. American opposition to this secured its defeat. Mrs. Roosevelt said that slavery included the slave trade. Could the United States have been influenced by fear that the recruiting of workers by private interests in neighboring countries to the south might be interpreted as coming within the scope of the "slave trade?" (Incidentally in the Declaration, as finally passed by the General Assembly, both slavery and the slave trade are condemned. This means that the American view which prevailed in the small eighteen-member Commission could not prevail in the Assembly of almost sixty nations where the proportion of under-developed countries is greater than in the Commission.)

For some curious reason, the Americans have consistently opposed a Soviet suggestion that there should be an article to the effect that everyone has the right to participate in the elections of the government of his country.

More explicable was Mrs. Roosevelt's desire to include the words "of his own choice" in the clause providing that everyone had the right to join a trade union. The American proposal was, of course, directed against the closed shop, whereas in the European and Commonwealth countries where trade unionism has been accepted for so long, trade union solidarity is part of the tradition and it would be an anti-union act to advocate something which might split the workers or allow for scab unions. Mrs. Roosevelt's amendment would have given UN sanction for union-splitting and the formation of company unions. The opposition to her idea was so great that she withdrew it.

When the article on the right to social security was being drafted, the question arose whether this meant security "against the consequences of" or "in the event of" unemployment, sickness, old age, and so on. The French were for the former wording, interpreting it to imply more ample protection. By now it should be obvious that the Americans favored the latter. Nor did the American delegation want to say that everyone has the right to medical care.

(This same attitude could be seen in 1950 when another expert

body, the Social Commission, was drafting a Declaration of the Rights of the Child. This time the proposed clause said that every child should be entitled to free education and free medical care. The U.S. delegate fought strongly against such countries as France and New Zealand over the phrase "free medical care." The Americans wanted the word "free" eliminated. They were defeated by one vote, and on this occasion, the Soviet Union and Poland were not even present to swell the opposition total.)

A question which has agitated Europe for centuries has been the oppression of national minorities. In fact the Human Rights Commission itself has a Sub-Commission dealing with this phase of the work. However, when the Soviet Union (with first-hand experience) suggested an article guaranteeing the rights of national minorities to the preservation of their culture, their mother tongue, and so on, the American delegation was opposed. Was this solely because it was a Soviet proposal? In the discussion at the UN of any convention or other international instrument, the Americans have never willingly accepted the extension of such conventions to millions of people in colonies or territories held in trust for the United Nations; and when in the Human Rights Commission the Soviet Union proposed that the Declaration of Human Rights should cover the populations of "non-self-governing" and Trust territories the American delegate voted against it.

When the General Assembly finally adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, it asked the Human Rights Commission to give priority to the preparation of a Covenant on Human Rights and to draft measures for implementation. The reason for this was that since the Declaration itself had no legal standing, it was now necessary to go ahead and prepare a document (the Covenant) which, when signed by a state, would oblige that state to carry out its provisions.

Obviously, this was a horse of another color. As we have already seen, the Declaration, though doubtless having certain moral force, was not legally binding; it did not require the states members of the UN to provide for free speech, fair trials, the right of assembly, the prohibition of the slave trade, free education, the right to rest and leisure, the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being, the right to security in the event of unemployment or old age, the right to work, protection against interference with home or correspondence, against arbitrary arrest, against discrimination.

Faced with orders to work out a legally binding Covenant, what should the Human Rights Commission do? One of the world's leading authorities on the subject, Professor Lauterpacht, of Cambridge University, England, makes clear what should have been done:

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There has been a wide and growing acceptance of the view that personal and political freedom is impaired—if not rendered purely nominal—unless its enjoyment is made practicable by a reasonable guarantee of social and economic freedom. According to that view, which is fully entitled to respect, the precious rights of personal liberty and political freedom may become a hollow mockery for those whom the existing social and economic order leaves starving, insecure in their livelihood, illiterate, and deprived of their just share in the progress and well-being of the society as a whole. An International Bill of Rights which leaves these human claims out of account is incomplete to a degree which, in the view of many, is fatal to the authority and dignity of the enactment as a whole. (H. Lauterpacht, *International Law and Human Rights*, London, 1950, p. 284.)

But the United States did not see it this way. It fought for and won a draft which was "fatal to the authority and dignity of the enactment as a whole." Mrs. Roosevelt, of course, did not frankly state that the idea was to *eliminate* social and economic rights. One always says it positively if one can. The line was that the Commission should concentrate on producing a "practical" Covenant covering a limited number of civil rights traditionally accepted in the writings of the more advanced capitalist countries. Thus the Covenant would guarantee (with certain limitations) such things as freedom of thought and opinion, fair trials, freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of movement, and prohibition of retroactive penal laws. This would achieve several purposes. It was safe; it would promote no revolutions anywhere; it would require no federal legislation to alter anything in the United States; it could be used as a propaganda weapon—especially with "liberal" intellectuals—in the cold war if the Soviet government should refuse to sign it. And, perhaps most important of all, it would further postpone the preparation of an international instrument which would cover such things as the right to work, the right to social security (including medical care), the right to leisure and culture, the right of self-determination of peoples, the right of minorities to use their own languages, the right to be protected against discrimination or incitement to discrimination—to say nothing of the more "controversial" right to be protected against war propaganda and incitement to enmity among nations.

When the Americans proposed in effect that the Commission should not carry out the General Assembly's wishes that a Covenant should be drafted to cover all the rights in the Declaration, but instead should commence with a limited number of rights, leaving social, economic, and cultural rights for development in future covenants, there was some indignation. But when the United States succeeded in having even this limited number of civil rights further trimmed and

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whittled down from the comparable statements in the Declaration, there were bitterness and disillusionment even among delegates who, for political reasons, had to vote with the United States. The Commission was certainly not easily persuaded to take the American line, and it was here that the Marshall-plan countries in the Commission—Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, and Britain—again proved themselves, for whatever reasons in each case, the ultimate allies of the United States. Still, many of those who went along with the Americans felt that the position was a short-sighted one. The UN Secretariat felt that only damage to the work on Human Rights could result from what they privately described as a farce and a travesty. Some felt that it would be better to stop work on the Covenant altogether than to set its standards back several centuries in history.

One of the Secretariat, an honest French intellectual, the Assistant Secretary General in charge of Social Affairs, Henri Laugier, decided he could suffer in silence no longer, and, in an address to certain non-governmental organizations interested in human rights, he raised the question of the present usefulness of the Commission's work, the obligations it had to the UN and the peoples of the world, and the necessity of living up to the Declaration already agreed to by the General Assembly. A large proportion of the journalists accredited to the UN, the Secretariat, and most of the Delegations were delighted, but Mrs. Roosevelt was not. She called a closed meeting of the Commission and from the chair asked, in effect, that Laugier be condemned for not being a good international civil servant and for speaking on policy matters which were being considered by the Commission. The Commission, however, would not play. Several members said it was Laugier's duty as Assistant Secretary General in charge of social and cultural work to give his views. He was not condemned, he was not compelled to resign, and the Commission went on unasily with the work of toeing the American line.

The draft Covenant, finally completed in the spring of 1950, omitted any reference to fundamental social and economic rights and freedoms and, as the Soviet delegate put it, emasculated several rights included by the Commission (in the 1948 Declaration) such as the rights to life, to personal freedom, and to freedom of conscience. It should be added that the draft Covenant also included an escape clause providing that in a state of emergency, none of its obligations would be binding on signatory states. This clause was again a victory for the United States over those who wanted an escape clause only for specific articles.

When the draft Covenant came before the Social Committee of the General Assembly in the fall of 1950 it provided an easy target for the Soviet delegation. The Americans had miscalculated. For the

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underdeveloped, undernourished, and underprivileged countries also rose up against this highly Americanized document. The right to equality before the law was important, they said, but it was not as important as the right to eat.

The Mexican delegate wondered whether the fine promises made to the world after two terrible wars were no more than empty phrases. In his view, those who had voted for the Declaration of Human Rights had committed themselves to making it a standard for domestic policy. He was strongly in favor of including economic and social rights in the draft first covenant. Those who wished to postpone such action until some unspecified future time, he argued, took as narrow a view of human needs as the Europeans of the Victorian era who had failed to look beyond their tidy world to see the misery and subjection of other peoples.

The Indian delegate said that the draft Covenant placed before them did not adequately guarantee the rights and freedoms proclaimed in the Declaration. There was no reference to the right of people to participate in the government of their country. In its present form, the Covenant promised less than what the constitutions of most countries guaranteed to their peoples.

The discussion among the sixty delegations at the UN became a demonstration against colonialism, against discrimination, against imperialism. The Social Committee of the General Assembly to which the draft Covenant was referred decided to send it back to the Human Rights Commission and tell it to start over again. And in the accompanying resolution it gave some fairly specific instructions. It was around these instructions that the battle in the Committee was fought.

The United States, taking the fight to the enemy camp, wanted one of the instructions to be the preparation of a federal application clause which would ensure that American signature to the Covenant would be meaningless. Professor Lauterpacht puts it this way:

... in its proposals for a "Covenant" of Human Rights the United States insisted on inserting a qualifying provision to the effect that those parties to the Covenant who are Federal States shall assume binding obligations with regard to such matters only as the Federal Government regards as appropriate under its constitutional system for federal action, and that with regard to other articles the obligations of the party to the Covenant shall be limited to bringing its provisions, with a favorable recommendation, to the notice of the states or provinces. As in the United States the bulk of the provisions of an International Bill of Rights fall, according to the Constitution, within the province of the states, the effect of that clause would be to render the obligations of the United States largely nominal. (*International Law and Human Rights*, p. 302.)

The fight over this federal application clause took two days. The Colombian delegate said the clause would be discriminatory against unitary states, since if they signed the Covenant they would have to put it into law, whereas a federal state could escape this obligation. Even the Danish delegate thought the clause would favor federal states. The Egyptian delegate thought that they were dealing with a lot of "legal algebra," full of equations and unknown factors. Perhaps they might search for the unknown factors. The Polish delegate was less diplomatic. He said that one of the unknown quantities was the southern states of the United States. It was, for example, highly desirable, when the Americans signed the Covenant, that they should sign for Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina, states known for their racial legislation and racial discrimination. The Indian delegate said that her country had a federal constitution largely based on that of the United States and that her government's view was that a federal clause was neither necessary nor advisable since it would not be conducive to the promotion of human rights and of international cooperation.

The Lebanese delegate finally saved the day for the United States by providing some words acceptable both to Mrs. Roosevelt and to some waverers. He moved that any federal clause to be drafted by the Human Rights Commission should have as its purpose "securing the maximum extension of the Covenant to the constituent units of federal states." This change enabled ten underdeveloped countries to vote with the United States and its Marshall allies. About a dozen delegates of underdeveloped countries stayed away, and the Lebanese amendment got the necessary majority. Thus the Human Rights Commission is now instructed to write a federal clause. For the Americans, this was a crucial victory and was probably worth all their subsequent defeats in the Committee.

A second heated discussion took place on the colonial application clause. This provided that the Covenant should extend to a signatory metropolitan power as well as to the colonial, non-self-governing, or trust territories it administers. This amendment was aimed at the colonial powers, including the United States. If this clause is part of the Covenant, and a colonial or trust power such as the United Kingdom or the United States signs it, it is then applicable to Tanganyika, Nigeria, and to trust territories in the Pacific. On this question, the United States was heavily defeated by a combination of Latin America, the Far East, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. The minority, most of whom were once thought to be progressive, were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States. Denmark, France, Norway, and Sweden abstained: they prob-

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ably could not face their liberal electorates back home, and in any case, the French have an idea that the French Union is a federal state and that they are therefore protected by the federal escape clause which the Americans had already secured.

Another defeat for the United States position in the Human Rights Commission was a Yugoslav amendment saying that the Covenant which the Commission had drafted "does not contain certain of the most elementary rights." These words were adopted by 25 to 16.

Then followed an amendment put forward by Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia telling the Human Rights Commission to study ways and means to "ensure the right of peoples and nations to self-determination" so that its recommendations can be studied by the General Assembly in 1951. The United States voted against this and was again defeated. America's allies in defeat were the "white" part of the British Commonwealth, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Peru, Sweden, and Turkey.

Next came the real substance. Was the first Covenant to contain cultural, economic, and social rights? On the one hand, there was the view that work on these subjects should be postponed. This was put into words by an amendment sponsored by two United States satellites, Greece and New Zealand. On the other hand, there were separate and detailed amendments drafted by the USSR and the rival Yugoslavs which spelled out instructions to the Commission to include economic, cultural, and social rights in the first Covenant.

The Soviet amendment must have been drafted to meet the needs of the social democratic and parliamentary capitalist world, for there is no doubt that, without the Soviet tag, it would have got a majority of votes. However, it was defeated. The Yugoslav alternative was adopted by 23 votes to 17, with the United States and its reliable supporters in the minority. Parts of the preamble of the Yugoslav draft read as follows:

Whereas the enjoyment of civic and political freedoms and that of economic, social, and cultural freedoms are inter-connected and interdependent;

Whereas when deprived of economic, social, and cultural rights man does not represent the human person whom the Universal Declaration regards as the ideal of the free man;

the amendment proceeds to

request the Commission on Human Rights, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to include in the Covenant a clear expression of economic, social, and cultural rights in a manner which relates them to the civic and political freedoms to be proclaimed by the Covenant.

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It was this that the Americans voted against. And when the Social Committee's recommendations came before the General Assembly, Mrs. Roosevelt stated her "serious concern about the practicability of including economic and social rights in the first draft covenant. Her delegation would naturally have to reserve its position on the inclusion of such rights in the first covenant."

Thus did the United States serve notice that the fight is still on. In the Human Rights Commission in 1951, the Americans will do all they can to eliminate, and in any case to whittle down, social and economic rights—the right to work, the right to social security, the right to join a trade union, the right to protection from discrimination, the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being. Thus, again to quote Professor Lauterpacht, the dominant tendency will be "to adjust the level of the International Bill of Human Rights—a basic international instrument—to the urgent domestic requirements of the United States."

The Americans at the United Nations will continue to lead the fight to limit political rights and to prevent social and economic rights from becoming legally enforceable.

Don't we always abolish liberty when we are afraid or in trouble? Isn't liberty a psychological matter? Isn't it something that depends, not upon laws and constitutions, but upon our state of mind? Isn't liberty a measure of our sense of security and nothing else? Like democracy, like honesty, like peace, liberty has to be founded in economic arrangements that abolish fear.

—Lincoln Steffens *Autobiography*, p. 818

All censorships exist to prevent any one from challenging current conceptions and existing institutions. All progress is initiated by challenging current conceptions, and executed by supplanting existing institutions. Consequently the first condition of progress is the removal of censorships.

—George Bernard Shaw, preface to *Mrs. Warren's Profession*

LEFT SOCIALISM IN ISRAEL

BY AN ISRAELI SOCIALIST

PART I

After the allied victory in 1945, one of the most urgent problems to be resolved was that of the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people. The terrible sufferings of the Jews during the war, when six million were massacred by the Nazis, underlined once more the necessity of a solution—to find a home for the “eternal wanderer.” But national independence was not to be given; it had to be conquered. The end of the war did not mark the end of fighting for the Jews. First began the period of the heroic “illegal” immigration. In Palestine, as well as on the international diplomatic field, the Jewish people mobilized all their forces to fight British imperialism. In November, 1947, the United Nations recognized the justice of their cause by deciding in favor of the partition of the Holy Land, and the establishment of an independent state for the Jews and for the Arabs in it.

But this date marked also the beginning of open fights between Jews and Arabs. Armed and trained by British agents in the Middle East, Arab forces attacked the Jewish settlements. The high points of the fighting were May-June 1948, after the end of the British mandate in Palestine and the proclamation of the independence of the State of Israel. The victory of the Israeli troops brought the fighting to an early end; and in November, 1948, armistice agreements were signed with the neighboring Arab countries.

Now the period of peaceful reconstruction began. The most important problems were economic and financial, particularly the absorption of mass immigration. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, 450,000 new immigrants have entered the country—this in addition to an initial population of 700,000. In American terms this would be equivalent to the immigration of 84,000,000 persons to the United States. Different proposals were put forward for the absorption of this mass immigration. The left-wing parties proposed the establishment of a strictly planned economy, so that the population as a whole could carry this heavy burden. The parties of the right all proposed some sort of free-enterprise policy, so that business might flourish and investments of foreign capital be encouraged. Other

The author of this article is a member of MAPAM and also a member of a Kibbutz (collective farm) in Israel.

problems also, especially foreign policy, began to divide public opinion in the country; and the class divergences which were somewhat masked during the period of the war for national liberation began to emerge and to take on more and more definite forms. It is with this side of the question, perhaps less well known abroad, and particularly with the development of the left-wing Workers' Party, MAPAM, that this article will deal.

Before going into the details of our subject, let us review briefly the various parties which exist in Israel. There are three workers' parties: MAPAI (a right-wing social democratic party and the largest party in Israel), MAPAM (left-wing socialist party and the second largest party in Israel), and the Communist Party. In the Center we find the General Zionist Party and the United Religious Bloc (MIZRACHI). The General Zionist Party together with a splinter party from it, the Progressists, got about 9 percent of the vote in the last election.* They represent a typical bourgeois party having the support of the industrialists of the country. But their influence in Israel comes mainly from the support their party gets from American Jewry, and as the latter's financial help is essential to the present day coalition government, the influence exercised by this party greatly exceeds its numerical strength in the country. The religious bloc received about 12 percent of the votes in the last election. As we shall see later, this party, too, mainly because of the internal structure of the Israeli government, exercises a great influence in the country. This bloc is attempting to superimpose the ancient religious laws on the modern state of Israel.

On the extreme Right, we find the Herout or Party of Liberty. Issue of the terrorist clandestine organization, Irgun Zvai Leumi, it is based on the same pattern as the fascist parties in other countries. The violent attacks of this party, and especially of its leader and founder, Menachem Beigin, on the workers' parties, on Soviet Russia, and on everything slightly progressive mark it out as the most loyal supporter in Israel of the Anglo-American imperialists. Herout got 11 percent of the votes in the last election, but has since lost much of its strength to the General Zionists.

There are quite a few insignificant parties such as the ultra-orthodox party, the Zionist Women's Party, WIZO, and others representing ethnic blocs. In all, 21 parties participated in the last election.

*Since this was written, municipal elections have been held. They showed a sensational rise in the General Zionist vote to approximately one-quarter of the total. The chief loser was MAPAI. MAPAM achieved a small gain.—Ed.

The History of MAPAM

Unlike the left-wing socialist parties of Italy and France, MAPAM (Mifleget Poalim Meuchedeth=United Workers' Party) is the fruit of the fusion of three workers' parties: Hashomer Hatzair, Achduth Haavoda, Left Poalei Zion. Let us briefly review the history of these three constituent parties.

1. *Hashomer Hatzair*. This movement was born in the years immediately preceding World War I. A certain number of young Jews in Poland, particularly in Galicia, gathered together in small groups, not unlike the German scout movement (*Wandervögel*), and called themselves Hashomer Hatzair (The Young Guardian). After the war, some of the members of this movement emigrated to Palestine with the purpose of working together on the soil of the Fatherland. After long and dreary wanderings, during which they built roads and drained marshlands, they founded on April 2, 1927, the movement of collective agricultural settlements called Kibbutz Artzi, Hashomer Hatzair. They numbered at the time only 250, grouped in four settlements. Today, the Kibbutz Artzi encompasses over 20,000 members, grouped in over 70 settlements.

What is the political position of the Kibbutz Artzi? We read the following in its program: The Kibbutz (settlement) takes part in the class struggle (1) as an organized cell in the trade-unions, and (2) as a class-conscious ideological and political group. This means in effect that Hashomer Hatzair is a revolutionary movement which denies the possibility of a "peaceful transition" from capitalism to socialism, even in Palestine. It is impossible to change the regime by means of settlement work. The Kibbutz must also take part in political struggle alongside the working class.

For a long time the Kibbutz did strive to establish a real link with the workers of the town. Under the impetus of near-by Kibbutzim, urban sections of the Hashomer Hatzair were constituted. They were called the Socialist League. The Socialist League and Hashomer Hatzair cooperated in municipal, trade-union, and Zionist Organization activities. It was only in 1946 that these two groups joined in a country-wide Hashomer Hatzair party, thus doing away with this double organization. Among their most important members were M. Yaari and J. Hasan.

2. *The Achduth Avoda*. The Achduth Avoda (Workers' Unity) party was set up in 1919 at Petach Tikvah, near Tel-Aviv. As its name indicates, the party was created to fight for the strengthening of working-class unity in the country. Here too, an important part of the members of the party belonged to a settlement movement—the Kib-

butz Meuchad (United Kibbutz) which today includes well over 150 settlements with about 25,000 members. This party, like the Hashomer Hatzair, called for Zionist socialism and for social revolution, and it joined the Socialist (Second) International. In 1930, it fused with another movement, Hapoel Hatzair, a right-wing reformist organization not affiliated to the International. The unified organization became MAPAI (Palestine Workers' Party) which represented *at that time* the majority of Israel workers.

MAPAI presently became a typical reformist, trade-unionist party, not unlike the British Labor Party. It obtained nearly 60 percent of the votes in the elections for the Histadruth (the trade-union federation). An important part of the members of MAPAI, mostly those who had come to it via Achduth Haavoda, found themselves drifting further and further from the party, in disagreement with the reformist policy of MAPAI under the leadership of David Ben-Gurion. As early as 1943-44, one could witness an apparent paradox: the left-wing members of MAPAI during their daily class struggles found themselves nearer to the Hashomer Hatzair than to their own party leadership. Subscribing to the principles of Achduth Haavoda which had striven for the unity of all Israeli workers, they found that such unity could not be achieved within the reformist, right-wing-dominated MAPAI. They left the party fold in 1944 and set up an independent party under their *old* banner of Achduth Haavoda. Among their most important leaders were I. Tabenkin and A. Zisling.

3. *Left Poalei Zion.* Whereas the two movements already considered grew up in Israel, the history of Poalei Zion is mainly European. The Poalei Zion (Zionist Workers) movement sprang up in Poltava, Russia, in 1906, with the purpose of uniting Zionism and socialism. It spread quickly throughout European and American Jewish communities. Here too, the opposition between the reformist and the revolutionary wings quickly came to the surface, reaching a climax at the 1920 Vienna Congress on the issue of affiliation to the Third International, and brought about a split in the party. The new groups were known as Left and Right Poalei Zion. The right wing entered the newly founded MAPAI in 1931, whereas the Left Poalei Zion, although numerically weak in Palestine, succeeded in maintaining an independent party.

This group, among whose most prominent leaders were J. Zrubavel and M. Erem, joined the *reconstituted* Achduth Haavoda in 1946. Two years later, in January, 1948, the expanded Achduth Haavoda united forces with Hashomer Hatzair in establishing MAPAM. Each of the constituent organizations contributed about half of the original membership of MAPAM.

We have seen that these three movements followed different historical evolutions. We have now to consider what made them unite, examining their similarities and their differences. We ought to state at once that the union of the three movements was sealed in the war for national liberation which followed the invasion of Israel by the several Arab armies. The proximity of the three dates of November 29, 1947 (when the United Nations adopted the resolution calling for the creation of a Jewish State and partition of the country), January, 1948 (constitution of MAPAM), and May, 1948 (declaration of Israel's independence) is not merely accidental.

This does not mean that all three parties always held the same views on the solution of the Palestine problem. The very opposite is true. Thus Achduth Haavoda, which included some of the most important Haganah (National Defense) leaders, was known for its strong nationalist position, which did not stop short of actions of a terrorist type directed against the British army and police. It formed what was known as the "activist" trend. Hashomer Hatzair, which was still nearer to the colonization movement than Achduth Haavoda, favored the intensification of peaceful colonization and unrestricted immigration, but emphasized mass action as opposed to terrorism. These movements were also very far from sharing the same points of view on the Arab question, a matter which we shall examine more thoroughly later.

To the workers and peasants of both parties, unification was not a theoretical question but the practical result of their common everyday struggles, whether in the trade unions, or later for the protection of the attacked settlements, or in the fight for the "illegal" immigration. The consolidation of this unity by the formation of MAPAM marked the first step towards a strong united working class in Israel.

We have now to consider the ideological foundation of MAPAM, the political ideas common to all three of its constituent organizations. This platform was based, in all three cases, albeit with some differences, on the ideas of Berl Borochov which were put forward in the years preceding World War I. It was Borochov's merit to have analyzed the effect of capitalist systems on Jewish life. In spite of several deficiencies due to time and circumstances, his writings are an important heritage of Jewish-Marxist thought.

Principles of Borochovism*

Berl Borochov (1881-1917), born in Czarist Russia, became and remained until his death, one of the most prominent figures in the

* This summary of Borochovism is largely extracted from the book of M. Lahav, *The Jewish People (in Hebrew)*.

Poalei Zion movement. His ideas are clearly expressed in two of his works, *State and Class* and *Our Program*.

Having studied the economic framework of the Jewish communities in the Diaspora, Borochoy reached the following conclusions:

1. The Jewish minorities in the various countries of their dispersion constituted social cells whose economic structure was wholly abnormal. Only a minority of the breadwinners were employed in manual work. The great majority were engaged in all sorts of non-manual work: trades, office work, liberal professions, and so on.

2. Even those Jews employed in the production process, whether as wage earners, employers, or free artisans, were connected mostly with the very last stages of production, mainly in industries supplying personal consumption goods such as preparation of foodstuffs, clothing, shoemaking, furniture, and the like. Only a small minority worked in agriculture, in mining, or in factories operating in the first stages of production.

3. Jewish capital and the Jewish labor embodied in it were concentrated in enterprises with a low degree of capitalization—artisan or light industrial undertakings.

4. The process of accumulation and concentration of capital caused the "swallowing up" particularly of those types of enterprise in which Jewish capital dominated and which employed Jewish workers.

5. Borochoy also noticed the important differences between the Jewish big bourgeoisie, which suffered hardly at all from the general Jewish situation, and the petty bourgeoisie.

6. According to Borochoy, discrimination against Jews prevented the insecure middle classes, as well as the Jewish workers attached to these small capitalists, from establishing themselves on an economically more healthy basis. The Jews could not help remaining a people essentially composed of shop-keepers and white-collar workers, while dispersed in the capitalist world. Since this occupational structure of the Jewish population creates anti-semitism in all its forms, it follows that *it is only the establishment of the Jewish people on a sound economic basis in their own country which can solve the problem.*

7. The base of the Jewish worker in the class struggle in the countries of the Diaspora is narrow and insecure, since he is confined to unessential and unstable industries. Thus the solution of the national problem is indispensable for a successful class struggle, that is, for the success of socialism.

These ideas of Borochoy formed the general ideological background of the three parties which joined to form MAPAM on the basis of Zionist Socialism. At the time of the fusion, everyone purposely

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refrained from discussing the ideological base in detail lest the union should be delayed. Instead, a program of everyday struggle was adopted. However, MAPAM *was* defined as a workers' party which acts according to the principles of Marxism and the Soviet October Revolution. The fusion of the three parties, based on an immediate practical program, was, despite its limitations, an important step forward at that time toward the unity of the working class of Israel. But the lack of a well-defined ideological basis and the weakness of the organizational structure are now showing up with a vengeance and are causing severe controversies in the ranks of MAPAM. In order to understand this better, let us examine the evolution of MAPAM since its foundation in January, 1948.

(To Be Continued)

*How can we call those systems just
Which bid the few, the proud, the first,
Possess all earthly good;
While millions robbed of all that's dear
In silence shed the ceaseless tear,
And leaches suck their blood?*

—Philip Freneau

"Are you a Communist, Mr. Shaw?"

"Yes, of course I am. A war on Communism is ignorant blazing nonsense. Without its present immense basis of Communism and socialism our civilization could not exist for a week. . . . The future is to the country which carries Communism farthest and fastest. . . ."

—George Bernard Shaw, *Reynolds News*, London, Aug. 6, 1950

THE BASIC PROBLEM

BY STRINGFELLOW BARR

I believe there is a trick by which we Americans can understand these two billion men, women, and children scattered all over the globe. Will the reader play "Let's pretend" with me, the way children do? Let's pretend that you have not yet been born but will be born this year, somewhere on the planet, somewhere in this Mighty Neighborhood. And let's try to estimate your chances of living a happy, healthy, decent, and useful life.

If you are born this year, then on the same day more than 200,000 other babies will be born, all over the world.

You will have less than one chance in twenty of being born in the United States. Your chance of being born in the Soviet Union will be not much better. These countries may be heavily armed, but most people just don't live in them.

You will probably be colored. Remember that you and the 200,000 other squawking brats who will be the day's baby crop are going to be born all over the planet and that there are just not many openings in the places where the white race lives. You must take your chances with the other babies. And the chances are, you will be colored—colored black, or colored brown, or colored yellow.

Your chances of being born white this year are not more than one in three. Your chances of being Chinese are one in four; of being born in India, better than one in nine.

If you are born colored, you will probably be born either among people who have recently revolted and thrown out the white folks who used to govern them or else in a country that is still trying to throw the white folks out. If you are born in Africa, you are likely to learn the maxim: "Never trust a white man."

You have only about one chance in four of being born a Christian. It is far more likely that you will be born a Confucian or a Buddhist, a Mohammedan or a Taoist.

If you are born in the United States—and, remember, that's quite an *if*—you will probably live longer than a year. But if you are born in India, which is more likely, you have only a little better than a

This is an excerpt from the author's recently published pamphlet, Let's Join the Human Race, published by the University of Chicago Press. Copyright, 1950, by the University of Chicago.

one-to-four chance of living more than a year. But cheer up! your chances in some places would be worse; and, besides, even if you survive babyhood in India, you have only a fifty-fifty chance of growing to maturity.

If you are born colored, the chances are overwhelming that you will be chronically sick all your life—from malaria, or intestinal parasites, or tuberculosis, or maybe even leprosy. And even if you are not chronically sick, you are likely to be weak from hunger. You have about a two-to-one chance of suffering from malnutrition, either from too little food or from food that is not a balanced or nourishing diet. You have a reasonably good chance of experiencing real famine—to the point where you will be glad to eat the bark off a tree. But this chance is extremely hard to calculate.

Again, if you are born colored, you have only a one-to-four chance of learning to read. And since you almost certainly will not own a radio, you will be pretty well cut off from that part of the human family that has enough to eat and that is reasonably healthy. You will most likely live in a mud hut, with a dirt floor and no chimney, its roof thatched with straw. You will almost certainly work on the land, and most of what you raise will go to the landlord. In addition, you are likely to be deeply in debt to the local moneylender, and you may have to pay him annual interest of anywhere from 30 to 100 percent.

But enough of this "Let's pretend." No need to be quaint about it. What I am describing is the actual condition of mankind in the middle of the twentieth century. To explain how it got there would involve a good deal of history for which we have no time here. The point is, that is where it got. Many millions of these sick, hungry, illiterate, and oppressed people belong to "the free nations" we propose to lead in a crusade against communism. We had better take a good look at the real world we live in before we lead much further. We had better base American foreign policy on real facts.

When we Americans look at Russia, all that we see is tyranny. When millions of these wretched outcasts look at her, what they see is liberation from the landlord and the moneylender and the planned reconstruction of their country on the basis of modern machinery. They see a possible end to a kind of misery and despair which most Americans have never seen. Tyranny does not frighten them: they have never known anything else. We had better stop shouting slogans at them long enough to try with all our might to imagine their misery. This misery, and not communism, is the basic problem of our one world—the one world which modern science and modern techniques have built.

AS OTHERS SEE US

We plan to publish from time to time, under the heading "As Others See Us," comments and analyses by foreigners dealing with developments in the United States. The article which follows appeared in *L'Humanité*, the Paris morning newspaper of the French Communist Party, on November 20, 1950. It was written by Pierre Courtade, the paper's foreign editor, after a visit to the United States as a journalist accredited to the United Nations.—
THE EDITORS.

Before departing for Latin America, I would like to sum up impressions of my several-weeks stay in New York which coincided with the internal political crisis accompanying the elections. I record these impressions at a time when the question of war or peace in Asia, and perhaps even of world war, remains suspended on the outcome of negotiations over Korea at the United Nations.

First, I think it is necessary to explain certain contradictions which have appeared in my earlier articles. These contradictions reflect an extremely confused situation here, and this confusion in turn seems to me to express the hesitation of leading American circles as they contemplate the dramatic consequences of a new expansionist drive.

I confess to having been surprised at meeting among supporters of the policy of the State Department, hesitations and at times even an extremely significant bitterness. The truth is that many of these people no longer know where they stand or where they are going. They no longer have any illusions about the solidity of the "American party" in Europe, and they distrust the people at home on whom they are obliged to place their reliance.

To what extent would it be justified to say that this phenomenon foreshadows a "turning" of American policy in preparation for "peaceful negotiations" with the USSR?

No honest observer can pretend to be able to give a satisfactory answer to this question. The only thing we can say with assurance is that here there is none of that "monolithism," that unity of views, which would seem to be necessary for the advocates of immediate preventive war to be able to have their way. One of the most important things from our point of view is that the doubts which are entertained in circles where American foreign policy is made stem in large part from the action of the popular masses in western Europe, and especially in France. What one could call the "left wing" of the Truman party is profoundly troubled by the checks which the policy of Marshall-plan aid has received. If it is true that the spirit of the

Marshall Plan has always been that of a *military plan*, designed to crush the national independence of the European countries and to put them at the service of the American war machine, it is no less true that a certain number of Truman "liberals" (if one can use the term) have allowed themselves to be taken in by the mystification of "aid" to Europe.

In a word, no one here still believes that Mr. Jules Moch represents the French people. That by itself is enough to emphasize the importance—which might become decisive—of the action of the partisans of peace in France and Italy. Demonstrations, petitions, the heroic struggles of our longshoremen and sailors against the landing of American arms have made a considerable impression upon these people, with the result that they are beginning to understand that purely forcible solutions are impracticable.

It is interesting to observe that these "liberals" are to a certain degree joined—despite the horror with which they view the association—by a section of the old "isolationist" party (both Democratic and Republican) which has just had a marked success at the polls.

Let us say right away that these "isolationists" are in reality violent interventionists, as Mr. Taft himself recognizes; but when they examine the state of Europe and Asia after five years of Truman's policies, they arrive, albeit by a separate path, at the same conclusions as the malcontents of the Truman party.

The reaction of those who elected Taft is basically something like this: "For five years we have been spending billions of dollars, nevertheless every day inflation reduces the standard of living of the masses; our sons are dying in Korea. And for what? Europe spurns us, we must rely on Yugoslav "communism" and on the "socialist" Bevin, on the former generals of the Wehrmacht with whom the French will have no truck! During this period, 450 million Chinese have turned Communist and the whole world is looking to Moscow from which comes a ceaseless stream of peace proposals which cannot be forever ignored."

It is in these conditions that a man like Taft, enemy of labor and architect of the Taft-Hartley Law, finally managed to collect the votes of the workers *against* the "labor" demagogues of the docile unions which are tied to the Truman "democrats."

Faced with this double opposition, what are Truman and his friends going to do?

Clearly, they can't go ahead on their own. The weak Democratic majority in Congress, still further weakened by the traditional alliance between Republicans and Southern Democrats, precludes that. They are therefore going to try to create a "synthesis" of all opinions. Accentuate the interventionist policy in Asia to please Taft and the

"Asiatic party"; prolong the mystification of Marshall "aid" to appease the scruples of the pseudo "liberals"; announce economic controls and taxation of excess profits in order to deceive the workers while *at the same time* giving to the trusts the means of *practically* escaping these measures; step up the fight "against communism" and *at the same time* come out in words against the McCarran Law—such seems to be the program of the master of the White House.

Nevertheless it is plain that all this dodging, this black-white policy, does not resolve existing contradictions, contradictions which exist not only in the minds of people but *in the facts themselves*. In the final analysis, the whole question is whether it is possible to win a war against the USSR, China, the peoples' democracies, the liberation movements in the colonies, the partisans of peace in Europe, the anti-imperialist movements in Latin America, and the American working class itself which, in case of a crisis, would soon wake up to the realities of the situation.

To this dramatic question, only a small group of extremists (including many irresponsible journalists) unhesitatingly answer, yes. It is evident that the directors in Washington are infinitely less sure of the answer. It follows that on our ability to make them continue to hesitate depends, in large part, the peaceful solution of the conflict.

In these conditions, the development of anti-war action, opposition to the re-armament of Germany, to military budgets, to the war in Indo-China, cannot but cause hesitations in the American war party which is already beset with contradictions. And be it noted that this holds especially for France, since France is still regarded as one of the decisive "application points" of Washington's policy.

These hesitations are so much time gained for peace.

And the moment may come when the balance, which is already tipping in favor of the anti-imperialist camp, will tip so much farther that the warmakers themselves will want peace as the lesser evil, even with the enormous risk for them of seeing posed here in the United States the problems which capitalism is incapable of solving.

STILL TRYING

I pondered on my mission to this sullen, sinister Bolshevik State I had once tried so hard to strangle at birth, and which, until Hitler appeared, I had regarded as the mortal foe of civilized freedom.

—Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate*, Houghton, Mifflin Company

(continued from inside front cover)

this issue reached you and, if your sub has expired or is about to expire, renew right away. If the number is II-9 that means that it expires with this issue, if II-10 with the next issue, and so on. We would like to suggest that all II-9s, II-10s, II-11s, and II-12s should promptly renew. You lose nothing by doing so and we gain much in time, energy, and expense.

Contributions and new subs in response to the appeal we made at the time of the Matthiessen Memorial Issue are also continuing to come in, but we have still not heard from the vast majority of our readers. What couldn't be done in the way of building up MR, and promoting the cause of socialism in America, if *all readers* would turn to as a small minority already have!

We have in hand two substantial additions to the discussion of "Freedom under Socialism," initiated by Howard Kaminsky in the November issue and continued by the editors in the December issue. We also have Mr. Kaminsky's rejoinder to the editors, but his rejoinder to the other two pieces did not reach us in time for inclusion in this issue—probably on account of the slowness of the mails at this time of year. We hope to run the lot in the February issue.

Also in the February issue will be an important article on Puerto Rico, a subject about which the American Left knows very much less than it ought to.

The reaction to "Inside the United Nations" in the last issue has been lively. We reproduce here excerpts from a letter from a UN staff member. After expressing appreciation for the publication of the facts in the article, our correspondent proceeds: "I must admit that I was somewhat disappointed at the little attention given to prejudice and anti-semitism in the UN Secretariat—not only discrimination based on race and religion but also on political thinking. . . . You must know of the investigation into anti-semitism which took place last year: the fact that three supervisory members were found to be guilty, that two of them were separated from headquarters, but that the principal person involved is still employed and working at headquarters. I suggest that there is an abundance of such material. . . ."

To conclude on a more cheerful note, we quote from a letter we recently received from a professor in Bombay, India: "Let me confess that I read the opening issues of MR with considerable misgivings. These days it is virtually impossible to perform any effective service (or disservice) to society, without doing it under the aegis of one of the major political parties, whether of the Right or of the Left. But your penetrating and lucid analysis of the situation without any sloganeering and your unbiased advocacy seem to me absolutely priceless. Whatever the net effect of your writing, you have at least done your best to serve a crying need of our times."

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